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ABSTRACT 
The US Navy is at a critical juncture in determining the types and numbers of ships it will acquire, retire, and 
sustain to support an evolving US military 
strategy. In addition to determining how 
many aircraft carriers, cruisers, amphibious 
assault craft, fighters, and helicopters it will 
need, the Navy must determine how it will 
confront maritime irregular warfare. As-
suming an environment of resource scarcity, 
where new vessel acquisition to support 
maritime irregular warfare may be increas-
ingly difficult or unlikely, we introduce a 
method for evaluating the capability and 
costs of candidate vessels that are in the 
current Department of Defense inventory, or 
widely available from the commercial sector 
to conduct such a mission. Our method 
combines wargaming with cost analysis to 
aid Navy leadership in developing maritime 
irregular warfare concepts of operation as 
well as resource allocation decisions. 
INTRODUCTION 
As the US military increasingly focuses 
its attention on irregular warfare (IW), each 
of the Services-Army, Air Force, Navy, 
Marines-is struggling with how they can 
best leverage resources and capabilities to 
address current and emerging asymmetric 
threats. Conventional nation-to-nation con-
flicts are not the norm in warfare. The United 
States has used military force more than 300 
times since the American Revolution, and 
that includes only 11 declared wars and 
some sustained conventional conflicts. There 
have been roughly 30 major conflicts during 
the past decade, and only four actually oc-
curred between nations Oogerst, 2009). His-
tory shows that IW is a regular occurrence, 
and our Armed Services are adapting to ir-
regular challenges faced in this more com-
mon form of warfare. 
An increasingly stressed budget envi-
ronment requires the Navy and the other 
Services to examine their portfolio of cur-
rent and planned weapon systems with ever 
greater scrutiny. Large and expensive vessel 
platforms continue to be the planned solu-
tion to prosecute contemporary and future 
conflicts (US DoD, 2012; O'Rourke, 2012). 
The tendency to focus resources on rela-
tively few, large, and costly platforms that 
complement combat units organized to wage 
major wars has proven difficult to adapt 
to effectively confront smaller asymmetric 
and irregular threats. 
Selecting and acquiring vessels neces-
sary to prosecute maritime IW is a complex 
strategic process that requires considerations 
of the operational environment, vessel capa-
bility, and costs to deploy the vessel. Unlike 
the private commercial economic sector, the 
Department of Defense (000) does not plan 
operations for financial outcomes. On the con-
trary, defense planning focuses on operational 
outcomes with resources that are budgeted to 
achieve those outcomes in support of the Na-
tional Security Strategy, Defense Planning 
Guidance, and National Military Strategy. 
As budgets are reduced, and strategic as well 
as operational goals remain unchanged or 
broaden in their scope, the resources neces-
. sary to meet those strategic and operational 
objectives must be reevaluated and alter-
natives examined. Selecting the right mix 
of vessels to accomplish maritime IW 
missions will be important both in terms 
of operational effectiveness (capability) and 
efficiency (cost). 
A critical part of the examination pro-
cess should be an analysis of alternative 
resources that might be used to achieve 
desired strategic and operational goals. For 
this study, we focus on resources that al-
ready exist within the Department of De-
fense or those that exist in the commercial 
domain and may be easily and quickly adap-
ted to defense applications without going 
through a formal acquisition process. The 
analysis of alternatives (AoA) should not 
only examine the capabilities of competing 
resource types and issue recommendations 
based upon the perceived superiority of 
one resource's inherent capabilities versus' 
that of another, but it should also examine 
the relative economic investment of each re-
source so that decision makers may consider 
alternative force structures with differing 
quantities of each candidate resource. For ex-
ample, acquiring multiple quantities of re-
source A that on a one-to--one basis may be 
inferior to a competitor resource B, but when 
deployed in a group, A may actually provide 
capabilities superior to one unit of B that 
were not previously considered. 
Utilizing wargaming and cost analysis, 
we propose a methodological process for 
evaluating alternative resources that are 
currently in the 000 inventory, or available 
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IRREGULAR WARFARE 
from the commercial sector, based on their capa-
bilities in an operational scenario and then com-
paring the relative cost of employing those 
resources (see Figure 1). Our methodology al-
lows decision makers to not only strategically 
evaluate alternative resources on their inherent 
capabilities but also provides an immediate, 
operational cost metric that may be used to con-
sider alternative force structures: the cost of 
employing each resource on a daily basis. The 
first step in the process is the definition of the re-
source needs in terms of operational missions 
and scenarios. This requires operationally de-
fining a strategy and identifying operational 
goals or "mission sets" that, taken together, 
would result in the execution of the strategy. 
The second step is to identify several candidate 
resources that will likely satisfy the operational 
need and be capable of contributing to meeting 
the operational objective. The third step is to 
evaluate the alternative resource capabilities in 
a simulated environment that is meant to emu-
late the operational missions and scenarios for 
which the resource will be used. The fourth step 
is to determine a cost metric whereby each re-
source may be compared on a time-use basis such 
as cost per hour, cost per day, or cost per quarter. 
The fifth step in the process is to analyze the cost 
for capabilities of each resource by comparing the 
time-use costs to the capabilities that may be 
brought to bear by each resource during the time 
it is employed. This step provides decision 
makers a foundation upon which they may eval-
uate different mixes of each resource to achieve 
operational outcomes. The final step is to combine 
the capabilities and cost analysis to make a deci-
sion about how to use existing resources and 
how to allocate the budget for alternative re-
sources that can achieve operational outcomes to 
support the overall organizational strategy. 
Should the needs or costs change, then the appro-
priate step(s) should be revisited. The entire pro-
cess can be repeated as needs, capabilities, 
and/or cost information becomes more refined. 
This research provides an example of a cost 
and capabilities trade-off analysis for consider-
ing alternative resources to meet an emerging 
mission requirement. Using maritime IW as a 
mission context, we explore the capabilities and 
operational costs of three candidate vessels and 
discuss the relative merits of each maritime 
Define needs in terms of operational 
missions & scenarios 
! 
Identify candidate resources within the 000 or in 
the commercial sector to meet 
operational needs 
1 
Evaluate resource capabilities 
. in a simulated operational environment 
1 
Determine a time-use cost metric that may be 
used for comparing alternative resources 
1 
Analyze the cost associated with employing each 
resource against its capabilities brought to bear 
during its employment 
1 
Allocate resources to missions & scenarios 
based upon capabilities and costs 
Figure 1. A method for evaluating alternative 
resources. 
platform. This work extends the AoA approach 
beyond the materiel solution analysis phase of 
the DoD acquisition process by introducing a 
method for evaluating vessels currently residing 
in the DoD inventory, or widely available in the 
commercial sector, that is easy to implement 
and understand by upper-level decision makers 
to evaluate resources to be utilized in emerging 
scenarios or mission environments. The addi-
tion of wargaming to an AoA approach allows 
decision makers to see how specific vessel ca-
pabilities may broaden or constrict the opera-
tional decision space of commanding officers, 
which necessarily has implications for opera-
tionaloutcomes. 
SELECTING VESSELS TO SUPPORT 
MARITIME IRREGULAR WARFARE 
We explore the capabilities and costs of 
three different vessels to meet the mission 
Military Operations Research, V18 N3 2013 
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requirements of potential maritime IW scenarios 
and then show how such a capability and cost 
analysis might be used by decision makers to 
assign specific vessel types to particular opera-
tional areas based upon the mission requirement. 
Although maritime IW is not specifically defined 
by the Navy or in joint doctrine, it has been in 
existence in some form since the dawn of sea 
power. In simple terms, it is the maritime com-
ponent of IW, or IW conducted from or on a 
body of water. In order to select vessels appropri-
ate for conducting maritime IW, it is necessary to 
define the concept in operational terms. Gener-
ally speaking, the types of maritime IWopera-
tional missions conducted over the last 50 years 
in oceanSi seas, and inland waters have remained 
relatively consistent with the exception of tech-
nological advances. Naval guerrillas relying on 
individual combat swimmers, high-speed boats, 
or unconventional submarine platforms for am-
phibious raids, clandestine reconnaissance, in-
filtrating forces ashore, or attacks on military 
and shipping vessels typify maritime IW opera-
tional scenarios in the littoral (Sutton, 2000). Re-
searchers at the RAND Corporation recently 
defined maritime IWas "operations involving 
at least one irregular actor or tactic that aim to 
shape the maritime environment in at least 
one of three ways: (1) to prevent supplies or 
personnel support from reaching an adversary, 
(2) to increase the capacity of partner naval and 
maritime forces, or (3) to project tailored US 
power ashore to directly confront adversary 
forces, when necessary" (Dunigan et al., 2012). 
The Congressional Research Service recently 
identified a broad range of IW activities con-
ducted by the Navy to include operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan (O'Rourke, 2011). The 
types of IWactivities in which the Navy has been 
engaged in the last five years may be reduced to 
five broad categories or mission sets (Table 1). 
Security force operations and assistance re-
fer to exercises, patrols, and missions with for-
eign navies, coast guards, and maritime police 
forces to improve their ability to conduct mari-
time security operations, as well as operations 
to guard infrastructure, facilities, and supply 
lines that are of strategic interest to the United 
States (O'Rourke, 2011). Civil-military opera-
tions refer to the use of Navy hospital ships, ex-
peditionary medical and fleet surgical teams, 
ilitary Operations Research, V18 N3 2013 
Table 1. Maritime irregular warfare (lW) mission sets. 
Maritime IW Mission Sets 
Security force operations and assistance 
Civil-military operations 
Counterterrorism/ piracy / narcotics 
Building maritime partner capability 
and capacity 
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
and naval construction units to provide medical 
and construction services (to include humani-
tarian and disaster response and relief) in for- . 
eign countries as a complement to other US i 
diplomatic and development activities in those 
countries (O'Rourke, 2011). Counterterrorism, 
counterpiracy and countemarcotics activities· 
include the interdiction, destruction, and dis-
couragement of illegal trafficking, piracy, or ter-
roristic acts in the maritime environment. The 
building of maritime partner capacity and capa-
bility refers to the investment of time and re-
sources in developing partner nation navies to 
function effectively in order to deny sanctuaries', 
to pirates, illegal traffickers, violent extremists, 
and other nefarious parties (O'Rourke, 2011). ' 
Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(ISR) activities refer to those actions under- ' 
taken to gain an understanding, as well as specific 
situational dispositions, of active or potential 
threats to US or partner nation interests through 
the use of human and electronic means. 
EVALUATING VESSEL CAPABILITIES 
THROUGH WARGAME SIMULATION 
Wargaming has long been recognized by the 
military as the best peacetime test ofa war plan 
(Mood, 1954). The earliest formal wargames 
may be traced back to the introduction of the 
rules to kriegsspiel by Von Reisswitz (McHugh, 
1966; Perla, 1990). Andlinger (1958) was one of . 
the first to point out the usefulness of wargames , 
for business, and by 1963 the US Army's Strategy 
and Analysis Group (STAG) had estimated that, 
more than 200 major corporations were using 
wargames for developing and testing strategies 
(Paxson, 1963). Wargaming continues to play 
an important role in the development and testing, 
Page 23 
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of military strategy (Brennan, 2002; Perla, 2008), 
and the contemporary business teaching case 
used in master of business administration 
(MBA) programs across the United States may 
be regarded as an outgrowth of the type of 
scenario-based decision making that takes place 
in wargaming. 
The purpose of wargaming is exploratory in 
nature and is used "to investigate the processes 
of combat, [and] not to assist... in calculating 
the outcomes of those processes" (Perla, 1990). 
The intent of the wargame and analysis of this 
study was to compare and contrast the capabil-
ities of three candidate ships as well as their 
ability to successfully complete anticipated 
missions in support of maritime IW. The war-
game allowed us to explore the decision process 
of vessel commanders and how the relative 
strengths and weaknesses-the capabilities-of 
each vessel either constrained or expanded the 
commander's decision space as well as their abil-
ity to complete specific missions. 
The candidate ships were a chartered com-
mercial support vessel similar to an ocean-
going tug (hereafter referred to as a CSV), the 
High Speed Vessel (HSV)-X1 Joint Venture, and 
the Littoral Combat Ship USS Freedom (LCS-1). 
These candidate ships were selected based upon 
past success with vessels in their class and future 
availability for the maritime IW mission. 
The Chartered Commercial Support 
Vessel (CSV) 
The chartered CSV considered in the war-
game was a 220-foot long, 56-foot wide ocean-
going tugboat with a 16-foot beam and a working 
deck of 3,640 square feet; this type of craft is cur-
rently in the inventory of vessels operated by 
US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). 
The vessel was assumed to meet the standards 
set by the International Convention for Safety 
of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and be modified so that 
it can accomplish its primary mission which is 
to support, launch, recover, refuel, rearm, and 
provide limited maintenance to various-sized 
craft, to include the Naval Special Warfare 
(NSW) ll-meter Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat 
(RHIB) and a vessel similar in configuration 
and capability to the MK V Special Operations 
Craft (Soq, which was retired in late 2012. 
The cost of all modifications to the CSV to ac-
complish its missions during the wargame anal-
ysis is captured in a later section, "Cost Versus 
Capabilities Trade-offs." For the purposes of the 
wargame, we assumed the CSV was armed with 
two .50 caliber machine guns and had four RHIBs. 
The High-Speed Vessel X-1 Joint 
Venture 
After the terrorist attacks on the World 
Trade Center in New York on September 11, 
2001, USSOCOM negotiated to take the last 
two years of a five-year split lease of the HSV 
Xl Joint Venture that was managed jointly by 
the Army and Navy. The purpose of taking over 
the lease was to evaluate the vessel's ability to 
perform specific missions and to conduct lim-
ited operational experiments in order to assess 
the vessel's usefulness in maritime IWapplica-
tions. Essentially a high-speed catamaran origi-. 
nally designed as a ferry, the HSV was modified 
for military purposes. The HSV was used by 
USSOCOM in many areas of the world, includ-
ing the Philippines, over this two-year span and 
even used as part of the invasion force for Oper-
ation Iraqi Freedom by speeding it into the shal-
low regions of the Persian Gulf. Use of the vessel 
was discontinued when its lease expired after 
two years. There were no other high-speed cat-
amarans commercially available to replace the 
vessel when its lease expired, and all other cata-
marans with suitable configurations or capabil-
ities were either already under charter or not 
available in a timely manner (MSC, 2010). The 
HSV has a length of 331 feet, a beam of 87 feet, 
and a helicopter pad capable of accommodating 
a MH-60R helicopter. For the purposes of the 
wargame, we assumed the vessel was armed 
with one 25-mm gun, two .50 caliber machine 
guns, two MK-19 40-mm belt-fed automatic gre-
nade launchers, and had two 11-meter RHIBs. 
The LCS-1 USS Freedom 
The USS Freedom is part of a new class of 
ship designed specifically to support" A Coop-
erative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower," 
which outlines how Navy, Coast Guard, and 
Marine Corps maritime power will be used to 
Military Operations Research, V18 N3 201. 
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protect vital US interests over the next several 
decades. The USS Freedom is designed to conduct 
shallow water missions in the littoral to include 
engagement of small boats, antisubmarine oper-
ations, mine-sweeping, and humanitarian opera-
tions. With a speed of 45 knots, one 57-rom gun, 
two 30 mm cannons, four .sO-caliber machine 
guns, and a helicopter detachment consisting of 
a single MH-60R with a helicopter pad and a plan 
to add a vertical take-off unmanned aerial vehi-
cle, the LCS is fast, lethal, and can react to a wide 
range of contingencies. 
Wargame Description 
The wargame simulation conducted to eval-
uate the capabilities of each vessel in a maritime 
IW scenario was set in the Republic of the Phil-




Figure 2. Republic of the Philippines: Setting for the 
wargame exercise. 
The wargame was an open-seminar exercise 
adjudicated and run by a moderator and assisted 
by several monitors and "red team" members 
whose role was to act as adversaries during spe-
cific scenarios. The game board was a computer-
generated map display that included custom 
game piece icons with a separate fuel gauge 
and fuel use manager that calculated and mon-
itored fuel burn rate. 
Each vessel was evaluated across all vignettes 
in a single session across a three-day period and 
was commanded by a single captain who acted 
as a subject matter expert (SME) and responded 
to events in each vignette. The captains of the 
HSV-X1 Joint Venture and the CSV were retired 
US Navy commanding officers and the captain 
of the LCS-1 USS Freedom was that ship's former 
navigator who had recently finished a tour. 
Each of the three vessels was run through 
four vignettes that required the vessel captain 
to conduct one or more maritime IW missions 
identified in Table 1. The vignettes, as well as 
the maritime IW mission sets corresponding to 
them, are described in Table 2. 
These vignettes were designed to evaluate 
each ship's ability to accomplish designated mis-
sions, the logistics requirements and limitations 
(fuel usage and duration at sea) of each vessel," 
and the time each vessel required to arrive on scene ' 
for each mission, as well as the total time required' , 
to complete all missions. Vessels were required to,' 
return to base whenever their respective fuel level 
was near or below 20 percent of the total fuel capac-
ity. There was only one possible logistics services ' 
port (Cebu), and follow-on vignettes could not be 
executed until all civilians (other than the civilian 
mariners that were a part of the crew of the CSV 
and HSV) had been delivered to a safe port. 
Vignette 1: Humanitarian response. In the first vi-
gnette, a ferry capsized 50 nautical miles (nm) 
away, and support was needed by the candidate 
ship (CSV, HSV, or LCS) as soon as possible to 
quickly recover 400 civilians. The candidate 
ship's captain needed to utilize available assets " 
(e.g., RHIBs, MH-60R, and MK Vs) to recover' 
personnel as quickly as possible. Each captain 
was presented with medical casualties from', 
the capsized vessel and needed to both provide " 
medical support and transport casualties to' 
proper facilities. 
3 Military Operations Research, V18 N3 2013 Page 25 
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Table 2. Vignettes used in the wargame simulation exercise. 
Vignette Description Maritime IW Mission Set 
1. Humanitarian response Support rescue operations Civil-military operations; building 
maritime partner capability of 400 victims of a capsized 
ferry and evacuate three 
medically urgent cases 
and capacity 
for surgical care 
2. Insert Special Operations 
Forces (SOF) 
Transit to support insertion 
of SOF assets in response 
to a terrorist bombing 
and provide support 
Security force operations 
and assistance; counterterrorism/ 
piracy / narcotics; building maritime 
partner capability and capacity 
3. Conduct Noncombatant 
Evacuation Operations (NEO) 
for a medical emergency 
Conduct NEO of 12 American 
citizens 
Security force operations 
and assistance; counterterrorism/ 
piracy /narcotics 
Counterterrorism/piracy /narcotic ISR 4. Defend against fast boats Defend against a coordinated 
speedboat attack 
Vignette 2: Insert special operations forces and conduct 
security operations. In the second vignette, an im-
provised explosive device (lED) was used in 
an attack on a government building on Negros 
Island. The vessel was 125 nm away, and SOF 
support was needed as soon as possible to extract 
casualties and secure the area. At least one med-
ical casualty needed to be evacuated and the 
responding vessel had to provide medical sup-
port by utilizing its available assets. 
Vignette 3: Conduct evacuation operations. In this vi-
gnette, increased hostility on the island of Negros 
resulted in the need to evacuate American citi-
zens from the embassy. The mission for the 
SOF was to evacuate 12 American citizens, who 
were 100 nm from the vessel's location. 
Vignette 4: Defend against small boats. During the fi-
nal vignette, vessels were attacked within 20 nm 
from the port of Cebu as they were heading in-
bound to refuel. Three small boats harassed the 
inbound vessel and the ship's captain had to uti-
lize available assets and the ship's native capa-
bilities to defend the ship against the small-boat 
attack. 
Wargame Results 
The metrics of merit that were used to judge 
the most capable platform were mission com-
pletion time, scenario completion time (time to 
complete all four mission vignettes), average 
vessel speed, and fuel consumption. The LCS 
was considered the most capable ship for the vi-
gnettes encountered due to its embarked heli-
copter detachment, its defensive capabilities, 
and its ability to deal with unforeseen emergen-
cies. The HSV was also considered to be very ca-
pable due to its speed and flight deck. However, 
utilization of the flight deck depended upon ex-
ternal assets; during the wargame simulation, 
the needed helicopter assets were available but 
were two hours away and, unlike the LCS, not 
organic to the HSV itself. Furthermore, the HSV's 
high rate of fuel consumption and its limited de-
fensive measures were considered to be capa-
bility gaps for this platform. Finally, the CSV 
was seen as being severely limited in its ability 
to deal with unforeseen emergencies due to 
its slow speed and dependency on external as-
sets. However, the CSV had the lowest fuel 
consumption-6,713 total gallons compared 
to 245,609 total gallons and 41,919 total gallons 
by the HSVand LCS, respectively. 
COST VERSUS CAPABILITIES TRADE-
OFFS 
Having evaluated each vessel's capability to 
perform a variety of maritime IW missions, we 
now calculate the cost per day of putting those 
Military Operations Research, V18 N3 20: 
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capabilities on station at any given time. Evaluat-
ing each vessel on a cost-per-day basis provides 
decision makers with an assessment of the costs 
of deploying a specific capability for a given mis-
sion over a discrete time period, and further sim-
plifies the determination of anticipated costs for 
the duration of a mission. 
For each vessel, we collected data on the 
capital costs (such as acquisition and procure-
ment), or lease costs, as well as the operating 
and support (0&5) costs. We do not discount 
the costs because the purpose of the cost analy-
sis is not to arrive at a precise cost for each vessel 
but instead to illustrate the relative costs be-
tween each vessel to facilitate decision making 
with respect to which vessel type would be best 
to employ in support of different scenarios. Dis-
counting costs would be simple to implement 
and would provide numerical values different 
from the ones presented here but would not 
change the analysis itself or the conclusions. 
The cost data collected for the LCS was 
gathered from reports by the Congressional Re-
search Service (O'Rourke, 2011) the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO, 2010), and a Con-
gressional Budget Office report (CBO, 2010), 
which are based upon US Navy cost estimates. 
We used the lowest estimate we could find at 
$480M per vessel for the purpose of our analysis. 
Costs for the CSV were collected from actual 
budget-and-spending documents at Navy Spe-
cial Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM). 
Costs for the HSV were obtained through con-
versations and correspondence with the Mili-
tary Sealift Command (MSC) and are based 
upon actual costs in a previous lease contract 
for the HSV-2 Swift, which is an identical hull 
form and a vessel very similar to the HSV-X1 
Joint Venture. 
Table 3 shows the cost breakdown for the 
LCS in dollars based upon estimates by the US 
Navy and analyzed by either the CRS or the 
GAO. Estimated costs for the LCS have increased 
Significantly over time. The original LCS cost cap 
of $220 million per vessel that was established in 
the FY2006 Defense Authorization Act has since 
grown to a conservative estimate of $480 million 
per vessel for those that are procured beyond 
2010 (O'Rourke, 2011). 
The US Navy's estimate of $480 million per 
unit for the LC5-1 assumes a 25-year service life 
13 ilitary Operations Research, V18 N3 2013 
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for the sea-frame and a 30-year service life for 
each of the four planned mission modules (the 
mine-warfare module, the antisubmarine war-
fare module, the surface-warfare module, and 
the maritime-security module). The $61.7 mil-
lion per year in operating costs per vessel is an 
estimate that includes the cost to operate and 
support a mix of the two sea-frames plus one 
year of mission-module cost (GAO, 2010); be-
cause there are two sea-frames in competition, 
and the Navy has yet to select one of them, the 
estimated costs for the LCS are a mix of the 
two. The sea-frame portion of the 0&5 costs in-
cludes unit-level manpower; unit operations; 
maintenance; sustainment and support; system 
improvement; disposal; and command, control, 
communications, computers, and intelligence 
(C4I). The mission-module portion of the 0&5 
costs includes food and berthing, maintenance 
and repair, personnel, training, fuel, supplies, 
expendables, hardware, and engineering and 
technical support. Although the $61.7 million 
estimate for 0&5 costs may seem high for the, 
LC5-1, it should be noted that these are estimates ' 
and that estimates for the LCS have tended to ' 
increase (rather than decrease) greatly over time. 
To calculate the cost per day to deploy the LC5-1 
for a maritime IW mission, we take the estimated 
cost per vessel of $480 million and divide it over 
the 25-year planned lifecycle, which gives a cost 
of $19.2 million per year. Next, we add the .. 
$61.7 million per year 0&5 costs and divide the. 
sum by 365 days, which results in ($19.2M + 
$61.7M) + 365 ~ $222,000 per day. 
The HSV-2 Swift is a leased vessel that is cur- " 
rently operating as a Global Fleet Station Ship .. 
The lease was for one year with three one-year: 
options. The daily rate for the HSV-2 Swift was" 
$50,000 (which included the cost of mainte-
nance, repair, and a civilian-contracted crew) , 
and we have estimated the annual lease cost 
based upon this daily rate to be $18.25 million 
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and berthing costs for the HSV-2 Swift were $30 
per day for the 20-person military detachment 
(MilDet). We therefore have the estimated total 
annual food and berthing costs (excluding the 
food and berthing costs for the civilian crew, 
which are already captured in the daily rate) 
to be $219,000 ($30 X 20 (person MilDet) X 
365 days = $219,000). The fuel costs associated 
with both the LCS-1 and the HSV-2 can vary 
widely depending upon the number of days 
the vessel is at a particular speed. To estimate 
the fuel costs, we used fuel cost curves provided 
by the MSC that give the estimated fuel usage for 
various vessels, and developed an operating-
speed profile that assumes the number of days 
the vessel will have its engines running and the 
speed at which the vessel will be operating. 
After discussions with the representatives 
at the MSC who were familiar with the HSV-2 
Swift, and referring to observations during our 
wargame to evaluate vessel capabilities, we made 
some assumptions about the HSV's fuel con-
sumption and operating speeds (reported in 
Table 4). We assumed that the crew of an HSV 
deployed in a maritime IW environment would 
operate its engines 265 days per year; during 
the other 100 days the crew would perform main-
tenance or have other engine downtime events, 
such as port visits. The assumed operating-speed 
profile is given in Table 4. The HSV-2 Swift con-
sumes 420 gallons per day at idle, 14,906 gallons 
per day at 15 knots, and 36,788 gallons per day 
at 25 knots. After discussions with former com-
manders of the HSV we developed operating 
speed profiles to estimate the amount of fuel con-
sumed. We have assumed that an HSV de-
ployed in a maritime IW environment would 
idle 15 percent of the time and that it would 
operate at 15 knots 70 percent of the time and 
at 25 knots 15 percent of the time. Under this 
Table 4. Fuel costs of HSV. 
Percentage 
operating-speed profile, the annual fuel costs 
would be $13.156 million per year; however, 
it should be pointed out that operating speed 
and fuel consumption greatly impact total cost 
estimates. 
Our estimate of the cost per day to bring a 
leased HSV on station to support maritime IW 
(Table 5) is $86,645, which is the sum of the lease 
cost ($18.250 million) + the operating costs, con-
sisting of fuel, food, and berthing ($219,000 + 
$13.156 million) -;- 365 days. 
The CSV is under a one-year firm-period 
lease with three one-year option periods and 
one ll-month option period. The CSVoperates 
approximately 265 days per year, which is the 
same assumption used to conduct the HSVanal-
ysis. The baseline costs of the lease include the 
daily rate of $18,104 (or an annualized daily rate 
of $6.608 million), Navy administrative costs of 
5 percent on the total lease budget, and MSC ad-
ministration costs, which are 5 percent of the to-
tal lease cost. Actual FY09 costs for fuel were 
$2.2 million, port costs were $88,000, food and 
berthing costs were $84,000, and travel costs were 
$216,000, resulting in a total lease spend of 
$10.157 million. The cost per day (see Table 6) 
to deploy CSV in the maritime IW environment 
is $28,000 ($7.569 million in baseline costs + 
$2.588 million in O&S costs, then divided by 365). 
Table 7 summarizes the cost analysis of the 
LC5-1, the HSV-2 Swift and the CSV. By calculat-
ing the cost per day to bring a particular vessel 
into a maritime IWenvironment, and then com-
bining this information with evaluations of the 
vessel capabilities to achieve particular mission 
sets, decision makers may be able to make better 
choices about how to deploy different assets in 
different scenarios. The LCS-1 brings consider-
able ISR, maneuverability, and firepower to any 
operation relative to the HSVor CSV. However, 
Estimated Gallons 
Speed Fuel Consumed of Days Assumed Consumed Estimated Fuel 
(knots) (per day in gallons) Operating at Speed (in millions) Cost (in millions) 
0 420 15 16,695 $51,755 
15 14,906 70 2,765,026 $8,571,580 
25 36,788 15 1,462,315 $4,533,177 
Total 100 4,244,036 $13,156,511 
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Table 5. HSV lease and O&S costs. 
HSV-2 Swift 
Baseline lease costs 
Daily rate 
O&S costs 
Food and berthing (per year) 
Fuel 






to do so, the LC5-1 costs approximately $222,000 
per day. The H5Voffers maneuverability and 
considerable capacity at a rate of approximately 
$87,000 per day. The C5Voffers utility and econ-
omy at approximately $28,000 per day. 
ALIGNING VESSELS WITH MARITIME 
IW MISSIONS 
Earlier we stated that maritime IW is a mul-
tidimensional concept and that there are identi-
fiable activities, or mission sets, associated with 
its conduct (see Table 1). Accordingly, there is no 
universal vessel appropriate for all maritime IW 
environments, either from a capability or cost 
perspective. To illustrate this point, we consid-
ered four hypothetical scenarios, similar to real-
world areas of operation, with varying degrees 
of demand for each of the mission sets. These sce-
narios were intended for use as an instrument for 
Table 6. CSV lease and O&S costs. 
CSV 










Food and berthing 
(per year) 
Travel costs 










discussing vessel applicability within certain 
contexts that may share characteristics of a spe-
cific geographic region or area of operations. Dis-
cussing each vessel in the context of a scenario 
demonstrated the type of cost and capability 
trade-offs that must be made when deciding 
what types of assets and resources should be 
deployed, assuming a mission duration and 
time line, to achieve a desired result. 
Having explored the relative merits and ca-
pabilities of each vessel across each of the iden-
tified maritime IW mission sets (see Table 2) 
during the wargame simulation, and having de-
termined a cost-per-day to deploy each vessel, 
we now illustrate how our method could be used 
to assign vessel types to particular operational or 
geographic environments to accomplish specific 
IWobjectives. 
Maritime IW Scenarios 
In developing the hypothetical scenarios, 
maritime IWactivities were weighted based on 
discussions and interviews with 5MEs and 
practitioners of surface warfare and naval special 
warfare. For each scenario we have given it a re-
gional identifier which mayor may not represent 
the exact distribution of mission set activities 
but are meant only for illustration and discus-
sion purposes. Figure 3 illustrates the distribu-, 
tion of the weighted percentages among the: 
scenarios. 
Scenario 1: Maritime partnering, capacity-building, and 
counterterrorism. Scenario 1 emphasizes the 
building of maritime partner capability and ca- . 
pacity as well as counterterrorism with some~;: 
degree of civil-military assistance, security force (; 
operations and assistance, and 15R. The primary, ' 
objective in this scenario is to "win hearts and ' 
minds" in order to train a host nation's forces 
to combat terrorism and insurgency, as well as 
provide effective humanitarian relief and rapid 
response in case of a disaster such as a typhoon:': 
or ferry sinking not unlike operations ongoing' 
in the Philippines today. In this type of situation,!: 
a prolonged presence should be anticipated and' . 
sustained support for forces would be required. ' 
Although sleek and swift vessels such as LC5-1 " 
and H5V can offer rapid response to a host of ; 
isolated situations within this scenario, their,; 
~ " 
..;' 
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Table 7. Summary of vessel costs per day. 
LC5-1 HSV-2 Swift CSV 
Unit cost $480,000,000 
Baseline lease cost 
Operating and support $61,700,000 
cost 
Cost per day $221,644 
fuel consumption alone makes them cost pro-
hibitive when considering a long dwell time. 
Furthermore, any extended presence of a gray-
hulled vessel will attract the attention of the local 
population. 
For extended support of SOF in the region, 
a vessel such as the CSV might be preferred. Its 
commercial paint scheme allows it to blend in 
with commercial vessels, while its slow, lethargic 
pace and capacious deck and habitability spaces 
offer low fuel consumption and provide a sus-
tainable floating hotel for SOF. Additionally, the 
civilian crew of a chartered vessel blend in with 
local mariners and do not draw unwanted atten-
tion when going to port for fuel or repairs. 
The use of smaller, slow, mothership-type 
civilian vessels can be extremely effective when 
working in conjunction with small attack heli-
copters (AH-6 or similar) or combatant craft de-
tachments (such as the MK V). This strategy was 
proven during the "Tanker Wars" (1987-1988) 
in which SOF leased two oil field support barges 
for $21,000 per day to respond to Iranian mine 
attacks On oil tankers while simultaneously 
keeping a low profile so as not to provoke an 
outright war (Zatarain, 2008). 
Scenario 2: Counterpiracy. In Scenario 2, the highest 
level of effort was placed upOn counterterror-
ism, counterpiracy, and countemarcotics. SOF 
and conventional naval operations would work 
Maritime Irregular Warfare Activities 




together to fight against state sponsors of terror-
ism. From a maritime IW perspective, this would 
include maritime interdiction operations (MIO), 
which typically employ visit, board, search, 
and seizure (VBSS) tearns. These teams may COn-
sist of SOF, conventional sailors from ships' com-
pany, or US Coast Guard law enforcement (LE) 
detachments. In this type of scenario, a slow, 
minimally armed commercial vessel would 
probably be less than ideal, as is little more than 
a floating target for even the most primitively 
equipped aggressors. Cost would be less of a fac-
tor, as a combatant commander would want 
a vessel with combative capability. Because of 
the incorporation of conventional naval opera-
tions, sustained SOF support would not be much 
of a requirement, since specific SOF boarding 
teams would probably be temporarily embarked 
On a combative vessel for limited periods of time. 
A LCS or frigate could perform this mission 
adequately, and, given an assumed heated en-
vironment in which pirates, terrorists, or narco-
traffickers are operating with impunity, political 
sensitivity to a warship off the coast would prob-
ably be irrelevant, as is the case in the vicinity of 
the Hom of Africa. 
Scenario 3: Maritime capaCity-building and security force 
assistance. Scenario 3 represents a context some-
what similar to that encountered in Scenario 1. 
However, in this scenario, the overarching 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
Philippines Homo! GulJo! South Africa Guinea America 
10% 200;. 10% 20% 
10% Civil-Military Operations 200;'" 100/. 
Counterterrorism/piracy/narcotics _3"'~"_~~_ Building Maritime Partner Capability & Capacity lIJI.iliiMQ'W_ • t', 
Intelligence, Surveillance. and Reconnaissance 10% 100;' ·;20%,; 
Figure 3. Maritime IW scenarios. 
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emphasis is on building maritime partner ca-
pability and capacity as well as conducting 
civil-military operations. In October 2007, US 
Naval Forces Europe launched the African 
Partnership Station (APS) and the dock landing 
ship USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43) was deployed 
to the Gulf of Guinea to serve as a floating 
schoolhouse to provide "training focused on 
maritime domain awareness and law enforce-
ment, port facilities management and security, 
seamanship/navigation, search and rescue, 
leadership, logistics, civil engineering, humani-
tarian assistance and disaster response" (Ploch, 
2009). Different vessels (such as the CSV) may 
serve as a platform for the African Partnership 
Station, but an amphibious warfare ship, though 
costly, may be desired by combatant com-
manders, as it provides ample room for coop-
erative military training, berthing, and medical 
facilities. These vessels have a minimal footprint 
onshore, and their relatively shallow draft allows 
them to pull into austere ports to perform a vari-
ety of community relations projects. 
Scenario 4: Counternarcotics and ISR. In the final sce-
nario, we considered a context in which the 
counternarcotics mission was the primary focus. 
A fast and agile vessel would be preferred to in-
tercept the stereotypical drug-runner speedboats 
that are often portrayed in the media. The US 
Navy commonly and successfully uses frigates 
with US Coast Guard LE detachments for this 
mission. The USS Freedom has been successfully 
employed in this role as well and has interdicted 
several vessels and seized several tons of cocaine 
in US 4th Fleet's Area of Responsibility. How-
ever, a more cost-effective method for counter-
narcotics operations might be the employment 
of the PC-l Cyclone Class. These patrol craft do 
not have as sophisticated weapons systems as 
frigates or the LCS, but they do have the speed 
and firepower to satisfy the mission. The LE de-
tachments and special warfare teams can be 
embarked, and the PC's shallow draft allows it 
to proceed close to the beach, should any shore-
line maritime IW missions need to be fulfilled. 
RAND also conducted a study to examine the 
feasibility of using the PC-l Class as a small ship 
for use in theater security cooperation (Button 
et al. 2008). The PC would be given an updated 
propulsion system and improved C2, as well as 
a stabilized 2S-mm gun. Incorporating a mother-
ship concept, RAND found that the PC-l would 
be rendered fully capable in theater security 
cooperation missions, and this would likely 
be a more cost-effective way to conduct mari-
time IW operations, such as the one outlined 
in Scenario 4. 
CONCLUSIONS 
We have illustrated a method of combining 
wargaming with cost analysis to explore alterna-
tive resources or systems that may be employed 
to support maritime IWoperations. The wargam-
ing findings were supported by SMEs that made 
credible decisions that reflect appropriate utiliza-
tion of the maritime vessels under study in each 
scenario. Though our wargaming findings are 
scenario dependent the scenarios used are illus-
trative of common maritime IW mission sets that 
can be expected to be supported currently and in 
the future. The cost analysis was conducted in 
such a way as to make comparisons at an opera-
tional deployment level - measuring the cost to 
operate each vessel on a daily basis - to illustrate 
the economic implications of using specific re-
source types for specific scenarios. 
In the future, as in the past, the US military 
will have to respond to a wide range of scenar-
ios, and maritime IW is becoming an increas-
ingly significant part of the Navy's mission. 
Senior-level decision makers, both military 
and civilian, must decide on the nation's objec-
tives and strategies-which include but are not 
limited to the National Security Strategy, Defense 
Planning Guidance, Defense Planning Strategy, 
Steady-State Security Posture scenarios-and 
then acquire the appropriate capabilities and 
platforms to meet those objectives and strate-
gies. As the defense budget becomes more con-
strained, all viable options to pursue needed 
technologies or weapon platforms should be 
considered. Our findings are consistent with 
those of Hughes et al. (2009) in their descrip-
tion of how the Navy can develop "a more dis- .•. 
tributed combat capability for sea control and 
the projection of national influence from the 
sea" through the acquisition of smaller, single-
purpose vessels. Because of the cost advantage 
of the CSV, two or three of these vessels could 
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be deployed in an operational area at the same 
cost per day or less than the HSVor LCS, there-
fore ameliorating the disadvantage of being 
slowest to arrive at a scene of action. 
Gompert and Gordon (2008) found that the 
average length of an insurgency is more than 
a decade. If the United States is to deploy mari-
time forces in support of counterinsurgency or 
irregular operations, then it is likely that assets 
deployed to support those forces will dwell for 
an extended period of time. At $222,000 per 
day deployed continuously over 10 years, the 
LC5-1 would cost roughly $800 million versus 
a vessel like the CSV which would cost $94 mil-
lion over the same period. This is a difference of 
$700 million and does not include the costs of 
rotating the LC5-1 every six months, which is 
part of the current concept of operations for 
the vessel. Given the differentiated costs of the 
three vessels we studied as candidates to sup-
port maritime IW, it would be prudent to send 
the vessel that provides the needed capability 
(as dictated by the tasks necessary to achieve a 
mission within a given region or maritime IW 
scenario) at the lowest possible cost. 
There are also benefits to lease-chartering 
vessels in support of maritime IW to include 
lower up front costs (if the cost of procurement 
is extended over the useful life of a vessel), faster 
response times, and better value for taxpayers' 
money, particularly for those assets and plat-
forms that do not require an extensive acquisi-
tion process and can be purchased commercial 
off-the-shelf (COTS) or contracted through com-
mercial companies. Lease-charters offer far more 
flexibility in highly dynamic operational envi-
ronments since option years can be exercised at 
the discretion of the lessor. The flexibility of ex-
ercising future options allows the lessor to find 
the best vessel to meet current end-user require-
ments, whereas vessel procurement incurs a 
likely 30-year obligation to support, maintain, 
and utilize a vessel and limits the capacity to 
adapt to changing end-user requirements. By 
evaluating the specific operational need for var-
ious maritime IW environments the Navy may 
determine the correct mix of vessels to retain 
or acquire for its inventory and assign those ves-
sels to missions accordingly in order to achieve 
the proper mission effect which achieving eco-
nomic efficiency. 
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